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Abstract
The former National Security Agency agent Edward Snowden 
uncovered evidence of US cyber espionage. Thus this study 
examines the geostrategy of such cyber threats. The methodology 
adopted entailed a qualitative approach. This way, we are able 
to understand that a spread of US ICT during the 20th and 
21st centuries has created a global dependence on American 
technologies. Brazil’s failure to sufficiently develop its ICT sector 
could have led it to being vulnerable to cyberattacks. However, 
one cannot be certain that such a factor was behind the NSA 
surveillance issue, as evidence does not imply a causal relation.
Keywords: The United States of America, Cyber warfare, Brazil, 
Geostrategy.
Resumo
O ex-agente da Agência de Segurança Nacional Edward Snowden 
revelou evidências da espionagem cibernética dos Estados Unidos. 
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Este artigo estuda algumas correlações ligadas a essas ameaças cibernéticas, e a metodologia 
envolve uma abordagem qualitativa. Dessa forma, entende-se que houve uma disseminação 
das TIC norte-americanas durante o século 20, o que criou uma dependência global das 
tecnologias estadunidenses. O fracasso do Brasil em desenvolver suficientemente seu setor 
de TIC pode tê-lo tornado vulnerável aos ataques cibernéticos. No entanto, não se pode 
ter certeza de que tais fatores foram os motivos da vigilância eletrônica promovida pela 
NSA, visto que correlações não implicam em relações causais.
Palavras-chave: Estados Unidos da América, Guerra Cibernética, Brasil, Geoestratégia.
Resumen
El exagente de la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional, Edward Snowden, descubrió pruebas de 
ciberespionaje estadounidense. Por tanto, este estudio examina la geoestrategia de dichas 
ciberamenazas. La metodología adoptada implicó un enfoque cualitativo. De esta manera, 
podemos entender que la expansión de las TIC estadounidenses durante los siglos XX y 
XXI ha creado una dependencia global de las tecnologías estadounidenses. El hecho de que 
Brasil no haya desarrollado suficientemente su sector de las TIC podría haberlo llevado a 
ser vulnerable a los ciberataques. Sin embargo, no se puede estar seguro de que tal factor 
estuviera detrás del problema de la vigilancia de la NSA, ya que la evidencia no implica 
una relación causal.
Palabras clave: Estados Unidos de América, Cyber  Warfare, Brasil, Geoestrategia. 
Introduction
Speculations since the 1970s on electronic surveillance by the United States 
were confirmed in 2013 when several confidential documents were leaked 
by former National Security Agency (NSA) agent Edward Snowden—who 
revealed that the United States and its organic Anglo-Saxon allies had been 
jointly conducting massive surveillance activities (European Parliament 2001; 
Clement 2014).
Backed by national security laws, the United States had been intercepting 
heads of state such as Dilma Rousseff as well as companies and government 
bodies such as Petrobrás and the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy (Clement 
2014). Slides provided by Snowden (2013, 2014) revealed what seemed to be other 
targets, such as Google’s infrastructure, Russian oil and gas company Gazprom, 
Russian state-owned airline Aeroflot, the French Foreign Ministry, the United 
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Arab Emirates telecommunications company Warid Telecom, and the SWIFT 
network of international interbank payments.
Since these revelations, Brazil has been reinforcing its strategies and institutions 
to face similar cyber war threats. Such improvements have been implemented 
through new legal frameworks and technologies, such as the Policy of Cybernetic 
Defense, a Cyber Defence Command, a National College of Cyber Defense, a 
system of Homologation and Certification of Cyber  Defense Products, the Military 
Doctrine of Cyber Defense, a program of development and innovation in cyber 
defense, and so on (Vianna 2019).
Despite the Brazilian government’s intention to overcome its cyber fragilities, 
one must consider that sectors of Brazilian critical infrastructure have been 
intercepted in recent years. Hence, this study intends to project a general conjecture 
for Brazil according to the following logic: since Brazil has been a target of 
American intelligence, which uses cyber warfare techniques, and is dependent 
on foreign information and communications technologies (ICTs) and—mostly 
US—Internet content providers, there is a possibility that cyber-attacks directed 
at Brazil could be linked to the country’s lack of national technologies3.
Regarding methodology, this study employed qualitative methods to collect 
and analyze data. First, document-based research was employed, in which US 
government files were selected, ranging from top secret files leaked by Snowden 
to official reports available on government websites. Focus was given on files 
related to Brazil as well as high-tech policies. The same procedure was used 
to collect Brazilian documents, in addition to a literature review related to 
international relations, ICT sectors, and cyber warfare.
Notwithstanding, the exact amount of foreign ICT components that 
integrate the entire Brazilian society has not been found; hence, in this study, a 
non-statistical sample was used instead of quantitative methods. Moreover, 
a timeline with a retrospective logic was chosen for an investigation: starting 
from the NSA cyberattacks that had been revealed by President Dilma Rousseff’s 
government (2010–2016). Then, certain specific facts that occurred during the 
3 This work, however, indicates some important factors: importation of telecommunications equipment, foreign 
direct investment, and international cooperation with technological superpowers do not necessarily mean that 
the country importing such services and products makes the country vulnerable to backdoors of embedded 
systems or external cyber-attacks. In fact, even if Brazil masters all technological layers of the ICT sector, it 
could still be a target of cyber-attacks. Moreover, mechanisms such as cryptography are currently available 
for systematic protection. Therefore, it is important to clarify that this research does not intend to exhaust 
such issues.
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Cold War and post-Cold War period were explored. The early 2020s, however, 
were not explored as data and facts from after 2019 were not examined.
Second, an inductive reasoning line was developed to produce a generalization 
for our findings, as there is no intention to build a quantitative study with causal 
inferences. This study explains how the United States managed to spread its ICT 
technologies in contemporary history, as well as demonstrating the Brazilian 
fragility regarding its own ICT developments, bringing some general data of the 
ICT sector to the forefront, as it outlines neither statistical data nor a stratification 
of the whole high-tech supply chain4.
The first section of this article defines the post-Cold War scenario and some 
concepts of geostrategy and cyber warfare. The second section refers to the 
growth of US ICTs. The third points out the development of the Brazilian ICT 
sector and its outcomes, and finally, the study’s conclusions.
From Geostrategy to Cyber War concepts
In this review, the post-Cold War scenario is analyzed in terms of general 
geostrategy. It is evident that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
presence—led by the United States—has been increasing in Western Europe, 
the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East. There have been 
attempts at undermining Russia’s influence, dividing Russia and China, and 
stopping the anti-US coalition of the Asian Rimland States. This is, for example, 
what Zbigniew Brzezinski (2016) and Henry Kissinger (2015) advocated as a 
standard strategy (Cohen 2014). Conversely, it should be noted that there is also 
a reverse movement: the Sino-Russian rapprochement, the construction of the 
New Silk Road, and China’s growing economic presence in all continents, in 
addition to all the complex inter-Asian relations that have their own dynamics 
(Agnew 2008; Mearsheimer 2019).
However, such a framework cannot be viewed uniquely in stationary geographic 
terms because the dimension of geostrategic planning does not depend on 
territories, boundaries, deserts, seas, mountains, or forests (Cohen 2014; Correia 
2012). As Qiao, Santoli, and Wang (1999) assert, the strategic mode in which it 
works originates new warfare standards.
4 For example, the industrial sector of submarine cables has not been analyzed, although an overview of satellite 
manufacturing, parts of the IT sector, as well as the dominance of the telecom companies has been pointed out.
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After a DSP satellite identified a target, an alarm was sent to a ground 
station in Australia, which was then sent to the central command post in 
Riyadh through the U.S. Cheyenne Mountain command post, after which 
the “Patriot” operators were ordered to take their battle stations, all of 12 
which took place in the mere 90-second alarm stage, relying on numerous 
relays and coordination of space-based systems and C3I systems, truly a “shot 
heard ‘round the world.” The real-time coordination of numerous weapons 
over great distances created an unprecedented combat capability, and this 
was precisely something that was unimaginable prior to the emergence of 
information technology (Qiao, Santoli, and Wang 1999, 11-12). 
The importance given to the informational realm has shifted the focus of 
armed forces and states to new concepts, such as cyber warfare. It can be explained 
in varying ways. Nations, UN institutions, and authors may slightly disagree on 
how cyber warfare is perceived, even though its fundamental meaning remains 
unchanged. This article chose a general explanation, according to selected 
authors. However, this work does not include discussions on individual-related 
subjects, such as cyber criminals and cyber terrorism. Only the state-centric 
vision of cyber warfare and the way its features work is explored.
New electronic technologies have thus been incorporated into the armed forces 
in the 1980s and the 1990s, and a new vocabulary emerged. There is no longer 
a traditional war, although this still exists in parallel (Andress and Winterfeld 
2013; Kissinger 2015). In this situation, there is neither a formal declaration of 
war nor an early warning, implying that cyber-attacks may occur at any time in 
these scenarios. All means—not only hard power—are used to inflict damage on 
enemies, such as cultural diffusion through social media to win public opinion 
(Nye 2011), the use of economic sanctions to isolate and weaken a state, the 
use of lawfare as a weapon, and cyber-attacks. A strategy of gathering all these 
options of warfare is called a hybrid war (Andress and Winterfeld 2013; Nye 2011; 
Kissinger 2015).
Consequently, cyber war goals include damaging the critical structures of 
other countries (for example, the energy sector, water and sewage systems, 
hospitals, telecommunications, the armed forces, and so on). To clarify, one 
could “steal information [...] crash airplanes, or cause a missile to detonate in 
the wrong place [...]; financial systems could collapse, supply chains could halt, 
satellites could spin out of orbit into space, and airlines could be grounded” 
(Clarke and Knake 2010, 38).
Origin and analysis of Brazilian cybernetic fragility
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1109, 2021  
6-25
Brazil’s Green Book of National Security—the Livro Verde de Segurança 
Nacional—claims that critical infrastructures5 are “facilities, services, goods, 
and systems whose interruption or destruction, totally or partially, produce 
a serious social, economic, political, environmental, international or security 
impact on the government and society6” (Presidência da República 2010, 19). 
When it comes to the United States, the NSA, the United States Cyber Command 
(CYBERCOM), and the Department of Homeland Security constitute the core of 
US cyber warfare and defense (Andress and Winterfeld 2013; Kissinger 2015), 
and these institutional branches have been conducting cyber war activities such 
as supply chain attacks to implant backdoors into embedded systems, SCADA7 
infrastructure, and commercial devices.
Hearing McConnell, or his successor, Air Force General Ken Minihan, 
talk about NSA even on an unclassified basis, you begin to understand 
why they believe re-creating some of its capabilities elsewhere is folly 
and perhaps impossible. They both speak with real reverence about the 
decades of experience and expertise NSA has in “doing the impossible” 
when it comes to electronic espionage. NSA’s involvement in the Internet 
grew out of its mission to listen to radio signals and telephone calls. The 
Internet was just another electronic medium. As Internet usage grew, so 
did intelligence agencies’ interest in it. Populated with Ph.D.s and electrical 
engineers, NSA quietly became the world’s leading center of cyberspace 
expertise. Although not authorized to alter data or engage in disruption 
and damage, NSA thoroughly infiltrated the Internet infrastructure outside 
of the U.S. to spy on foreign entities (Clarke and Knake 2010, 23).
Essentially, Richard Clarke and Robert Knake give the meaning of those 
highlighted concepts as follows: “one former US intelligence officer told us, ‘this 
may mean that no one can hack Windows easily to spy on China. It certainly 
does not mean that China is less able to hack Windows to spy on others” (Clarke 
and Knake 2010, 49). In other words, they explain how China has managed 
to make a deal with Microsoft to allow the use of Microsoft software in their 
5 The Brazilian government approved Act No. 10.222, of February 5, 2020, that is the National Strategy of Cyber 
Security — E-Ciber. This piece of legislation encompasses similar concepts and provides the main relevant 
guidelines to all the Brazilian governmental branches. However, this work does not intend to analyze this 
piece of legislation.
6 Por infraestruturas críticas (IEC) entendem-se as instalações, serviços, bens e sistemas cuja interrupção ou 
destruição, total ou parcial, provocará sério impacto social, econômico, político, ambiental, internacional ou 
à segurança do Estado e da sociedade (Presidência da República 2010, 19).
7 Supervisory control and data acquisition.
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country, so as long as the American company relinquished its secret operating 
system codes to China.
In this way, different versions of Microsoft software are circulated in China: 
Versions that include Chinese government encryptions. Here, one can observe 
the problem of backdoors, through which unauthorized software or hardware 
weaknesses are put in devices to cause damage or assist in digital surveillance 
(Andress and Winterfeld 2013; Clarke and Knake 2010). As China utilizes different 
versions of Microsoft’s codes, it would be more complex for the United States to 
spy on the Chinese government and civilians. This also implies that the United 
States could engage in similar activities with other clients that do not have the 
aforementioned advantages possessed by China. However, this also infers that 
China could spy on other countries that utilize such software.
Such a deliberate operation occurs through supply chain attacks, in which 
intelligence agencies—such as the NSA—secretly work with major high-tech and ICT 
suppliers—such as Cisco, AT&T, Microsoft, and Verizon—to deploy unauthorized 
backdoors that weaken devices within the supply chain of certain products, 
such as aerospace technology and telecommunications (Deibert 2015; Powers 
and Jablonski 2015). Hence, through these strategies, governments can emulate 
massive digital surveillance. “As Admiral Mike McConnell has noted, information 
managed by computer networks—which run our utilities, our transportation, our 
banking and communications—can be exploited or attacked in seconds from a 
remote location overseas” (Clarke and Knake 2010, 38).
As pointed out in the introduction of this study, the US government has used 
the above strategies to access data stored or flowing through telecom networks, 
to steal other countries’ critical information such as energy policies and military 
secrets—not to mention the possibility of industrial espionage.
American ICT’s Origins and Strategy
The first section of this study has set the conceptual scope for analyzing the 
issues proposed. The second section is essential for understanding American 
cyber and telecommunications power. It aims to explore how these systems have 
been structured throughout the 20th century. Historic factors will clarify how US 
technology and telecoms became global, as if they were a geostrategic cobweb. That 
is, this section intends to explore a summarized review of the development of the 
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US ICT industry and its global trajectory. For this reason, data and sources from 
different years will be discussed. One will notice that the United States has been 
leading the ICT sector in recent history, despite competition from other nations.
Telecommunications are not a mere byproduct of the United States’ 
military–industrial complex, but its constitutive part, which is why Schiller 
(1992) defines it as the military–industrial–communications complex. The US 
government had provided a strategic direction to this sector in the 1930s and 
the 1940s. Young students and engineers and their small companies, such as 
Hewlett-Packard (HP), had been connected to large academic laboratories, such 
as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); the University of California, 
Los Angeles (UCLA); the University of Southern California (USC); Stanford; 
Berkeley; and Harvard, and these research centers have been interacting with 
corporations, such as RCA, Hughes Aircraft, AT&T, General Electric, Westinghouse, 
Boeing, and their private laboratories (the well-known Bell Labs is an example). 
All these research centers have been linked by the federal government in a 
government–university–market arrangement, which means that they have 
received government subsidies (Bingham 2016; Loveluck 2015; Mazzucato 2014; 
Schiller 1992).
World War II and the Cold War were the main reasons for the national structure 
of innovation. This context set the modern industry–military and communications 
complex, giving rise to modern electronics and microelectronics (Bingham 2016; 
Cassiolato et al. 2013). Such an institutional architecture produces a multitude 
of products through the so-called spillover effect, such as satellites, the Internet, 
micro-waves, new materials, and electronic devices. It is not by chance that more 
than 90% of the demand for semiconductors from Silicon Valley comes from 
defense procurement. Sun Microsystems, Apple, Silicon Graphics, Cisco System, 
Fore, IBM, Compaq, NCR, Cray Research, Intel, Motorola, Bay Networks, and HP 
are examples of Silicon Valley companies originating directly or indirectly from 
DARPA8 projects, which demanded new semiconductors, electronic devices, and 
software for the US Department of Defense (Bingham 2016; Cassiolato et al. 2013; 
Loveluck 2015; Mazzucato 2014; Schiller 1992). Whalen (2014) and Chomsky 
(1993) have called this the Camelot complex of private contractors, universities, 
and government relations.
The American government managed to improve the internationalization 
of its ICT sector after a series of events that occurred after World War II, such 
8 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
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as the consolidation of the American ICT market and the mastering mode in 
which President John F. Kennedy’s government conducted and gathered interest 
among the military, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
and private industry, such as AT&T and Hughes Aircraft. These actions brought 
about a global telecommunication system through technical cooperation among 
nations, in which the American government maintained its involvement through 
joint ventures, exportation, and foreign direct investments—That is, the Intelsat 
Consortium was created in the 1960s. In the 1970s, President Richard Nixon’s 
administration introduced the Open Sky and Open Door policies, through which 
institutional and political frameworks were designed for the projection of the US 
high-tech industry abroad. Meanwhile, President Ronald Reagan’s administration 
and its “Star Wars program” during the 1980s perfected innovation and technology, 
despite disputes with the Soviet Union (The United States Office of Technology 
Assessment 1985; Pelton 2017; Whalen 2002, 2014).
The United States, however, had understood that other nations would not 
accept the predominance of American technology and political influence. For 
example, France and West Germany had diplomatically pressured the United 
States to obtain space and ICT technologies. However, technical cooperation was 
not requested by only first-level allies, such as Western Europe countries. Japan, 
South Korea, China, Indonesia, Australia, and India also requested agreements. 
Brazil and most southern underdeveloped countries had been willing to cooperate 
to improve economic standards as well (Cervo and Bueno 2002; Pelton 2017; 
The United States Office of Technology Assessment 1985; Whalen 2014).
The United States thus understood the scenario as an opportunity to be 
linked to other countries’ development. This happened mostly during the 1960s 
and 1970s, which made the United States foster its policy of going global. Hence, 
agreements between Japan and the United States in 1969, 1975, and 1980 are 
exemplary in the realm of technological transference and cooperation, whereby 
American enterprises would disclose space and electronics-related information to 
Japanese companies and their government. This shows that American corporations 
have played a major role in Japanese high-tech development (Borrus, Ernst, 
and Haggard 2003; National Research Council 1996; The United States Office of 
Technology Assessment 1985).
For example, a number of Japanese technology development programs 
envisage an important international component. Several large U.S. firms such 
as Motorola, IBM, United Technologies, General Electric, and the Stanford 
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Research Institute, have participated in joint research and development 
programs designed to pursue Japanese national research objectives. These 
projects, which range from micromachine technology to supersonic propulsion 
systems, to new models for software architecture, offer opportunities for 
foreign companies to participate in significant development programs 
(National Research Council 1996, 44).
Most importantly, this strategy supported the origins of a new supply chain 
and entrepreneurship, the so-called Wintelism. Some of the characteristics 
and features of Wintelism are innovation and disintegration, although they 
helped the continuous process of internationalization of ICTs during the 1990s 
(Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard 2003; Hart and Kim 2002). Wintelism—Windows + 
Intel—refers primarily to the worldwide monopoly on computer models, processors, 
and operational systems, which are maintained by the symbiotic relationship of 
IBM—Microsoft—Intel. The IBM—Microsoft—Intel system was widespread 
internationally through dumping, maintaining monopoly status, and institutional 
support from the US government in World Trade Organization intellectual property 
TRIPs (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) in a way that the European 
and Japanese industries could not compete (Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard 2003; 
National Research Council 1996; Hart and Kim 2002).
Another example is the semiconductor and microprocessor sectors. Updated 
data demonstrate American Intel and South Korean Samsung to be world leaders 
in the microprocessor and semiconductor markets (Grimes and Du 2020). “With 
US companies dominating semiconductor design and South Korea dominating 
memory chip production” (Grimes and Du 2020, 5).
The electronics industry of the late 1990s bears only a passing resemblance 
to that of a decade earlier. Some of the names are the same—IBM, NEC, 
Toshiba, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), Matsushita, Siemens—but 
those big, vertically integrated assemblers of electronic systems no longer 
control the industry. In their stead, a new generation of firms has arisen, mostly 
but not exclusively American owned, who exercise the kind of market power 
(and have attained the market capitalization) that is but a passing memory 
for more traditional firms: Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, Oracle, Netscape, Cadence, 
Dell, Applied Materials, 3COM, SAP, Sun, Qualcomm, Octel. The new firms 
look nothing like the old leaders (Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard 2003, 56).
Grimes and Du (2020) have reviewed the macrodata of the semiconductor 
sector and found a leading position in the US high-tech industry:
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Having already identified the key companies in the different semiconductor 
segments, it’s not surprising to discover that the US accounts for 51% of the 
IDM sector (51% of the total GVC revenue), with 28% from South Korea, 11% 
from Japan, and 7.0% from Europe. The US is also the dominant headquarter 
location for the fabless sector (23% of GVC revenue), accounting for 62% 
of the total, with 18% headquartered in Taiwan and 10% in China. Taiwan 
has the greatest concentration of foundry companies (11% of GVC revenue), 
accounting for 73% of the total, with the US having 10% and China 7%. 
In fact, Taiwan’s TSMC alone accounts for 56% of global foundry revenue. 
Again, the OSAT segment of assembly and testing (6.0% of the GVC revenue) 
is dominated by Taiwan with 54% of the total revenue, the US with 17%, 
and China and Singapore both at 12%. In addition to the dominant role 
of companies from the US and South Korea in the semiconductor GVC, 
Taiwanese companies clearly play an important role in both the foundry 
and OSAT segments, while China is also growing in importance in both 
the fabless and foundry segments (Grimes and Du 2020, 6).
Bearing in mind the perspective presented thus far, the United States has a 
capacity over ICT networks that no other country seems to have9. “The United 
States has 25 of the top 100 Internet access infrastructure providers, and 55.43% 
of total Internet single-address traffic; thus, more than half of total Internet access 
goes through 25 US companies” (Pinto 2015, 69). These data also resemble 
the research of Ruiz and Barnett, with regards to the topic of “who owns the 
internet.” One has observed the tendency of telecommunication frameworks and 
concluded that there is an increasing concentration, centrality, and integration of 
information among developed countries. Furthermore, the data indicate that the 
United States continues to be the leader in terms of data traffic. This is where 
geopolitics matters (DeNardis 2015; Ruiz and Barnett 2015).
At the center of the network of ownership are ten companies: Level 3 
(USA), CenturyLink (USA), Telia Sonera (Sweden), AT&T (USA), Cogent 
Communications (USA), Verizon Business (USA), XO Communications 
(USA), Hurricane Electric (USA), Tata Communications (India), and NTT 
Communications (Japan). The most central company is Level 3, with a 22.3% 
share of the network, followed by Century Link 8.7%, Telia Sonera 8.5%, 
AT&T 7.8%, and Cogent with 6.7% of the network. The top five companies 
hold 54% of the network share, the top ten share 77.1% of the network, and 
the top 18 companies share 92.8% of the network (Ruiz and Barnett 2015, 44).
9 It is important, however, to remember that the United States does not have total control of the whole 
telecommunication and online networks. Otherwise, it could remotely activate the detonation diapositives of 
the Chinese and Russian nuclear warheads, which is a real concern in Russia (Van Putte 2016).
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This concentration of data implies what Deibert (2015) states with regards 
to the organic relations between the private sector and government in the 
United States. In other words, in addition to Facebook, Google, and Microsoft, 
major data, service, and technology companies—such as Yahoo, PalTalk, Skype, 
AOL, Apple, AT&T, Verizon, BT, Vodafone, Cisco, and Level 3—were involved 
in the cooperation scandal of data collection for the United Kingdom–United 
States axis intelligence, according to Edward Snowden’s revelations (Powers 
and Jablonski 2015).
This manner of government pressure on the private sector illustrates the 
importance of the physical geography of cyberspace. Of course, many of 
the corporations that own and operate the infrastructure—companies like 
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, Apple, and Google—are headquartered in 
the United States. They are subject to US national security law and, as a 
consequence, allow the government to benefit from a distinct homefield 
advantage in its attempt to “collect it all.” And that it does—a staggering 
volume, as it turns out. One top-secret NSA slide from the Snowden 
disclosures reveals that by 2011, the United States (with the cooperation 
of the private sector) was collecting and archiving about 15 billion Internet 
metadata records every single day. Contrary to the expectations of early 
Internet enthusiasts, the US government’s approach to cyberspace—and by 
extension that of many other governments as well—has been anything but 
laissez-faire in the post-9/11 era. While cyberspace may have been born 
largely in the absence of states, as it has matured, states have become an 
inescapable and dominant presence (Deibert 2015, 11).
Nonetheless, the federal government of the United States has a legal framework 
that allows cyber operations to continue. For instance, there is the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), the Communication Act of 1934, and 
the Patriot Act of 2001. As the main structures and institutions that manage the 
world Internet are located in the US territory, these pieces of legislation embody 
the legal framework of the American government when it comes to the strategic 
use of information—that is, ICANN10, 10 Internet root-servers out of 13, including 
the root-server ‘A’ controlled by Verisign, and the biggest ICT corporations 
(Andress and Winterfeld 2013; Bradshaw and DeNardis 2018; DeNardis 2015; 
Deibert 2015; Powers and Jablonski 2015; Ruiz and Barnett 2015).
Oher countries, including Brazil, have proposed the transfer of Internet 
root-server management to the International Union of Telecommunications, a 
10 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
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United Nations institution based in Geneva, Switzerland. If such a proposal were 
to be applied, the Internet would therefore not be centralized by one country. 
However, the United States has not yet accepted this proposal. The American 
telecom empire (Schiller 1992) does not want to give up its power (Andress and 
Winterfeld 2013; Bradshaw and DeNardis 2018; DeNardis 2015; Deibert 2015; 
Powers and Jablonski 2015; Ruiz and Barnett 2015).
Therefore, following the concepts highlighted in the first section, information 
can be gathered and organized based on the logic that this article has been 
indicating so far. In other words, the so-called going global of US ICT seems to 
favor the American capabilities of cyber warfare (DeNardis 2015; Powers and 
Jablonski 2015; Ruiz and Barnett 2015). The United States may have repeated 
the alliance mechanisms between governments and companies, which has 
been remarkably similar to the so-called seven oil sisters strategy11 (The United 
States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations 1975). Instead of big oil, telecoms have played an important role 
in geostrategic terms and cyber wars.
Brazilian Issue
How the United States built its geostrategy on the expansion of ICTs and its 
outcomes has been previously explained; should this scenario worry Brazilian 
authorities in terms of sovereignty? This section summarizes the history of the 
Brazilian technological and telecom sector and presents a discussion on cyber 
vulnerabilities. This work, however, does not aim to reproduce all the historical 
factors and interpretations involved in such an issue.
Telecommunications arrived in Brazil at the end of the 19th century, and 
most companies at the time were American, Canadian, and German. Expansion 
of the Brazilian communication infrastructure during the 19th century and the 
first half of the 20th century was slow and troubled (Lins 2017; Pereira Filho 
2002; Telebrasil 2004; Kubota and Sousa 2012). In the early 1960s, “80% of 
Brazil’s communications were under the control of a Canadian company called 
Companhia Telefonica Brasileira (CTB), working in the states of Rio de Janeiro, 
Sao Paulo, Espirito Santo, and Minas Gerais. Meanwhile, the US company Cia. 
11 In 1975, the US Congress produced a report in which the United States admitted that its geopolitical strategies 
directly involved giant private national oil companies during the 20th century.
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Telefonica Nacional (ITT) connected the states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul 
(Telebrasil 2004, 13)12.” However, the Brazilian market has approximately 800 
telegraph and telephone companies (Pereira Filho 2002).
The 1950s and the 1960s, however, were flourishing years for a nationalist 
and anti-imperialist mindset, which had grown since the Vargas regime (1930–
1945). Even conservatives—but mostly left-wing and nationalist establishments—
were willing to negotiate a new pattern of national development (Cervo and 
Bueno 2002). These individuals claimed that foreign private companies were not 
investing in either the expansion or unification of infrastructure, nor in research 
and development (R&D). Thus, to create a national telecommunications system 
that would be centralized and follow the strategic goals of development, Brazil 
initiated a massive process of nationalization without paying compensations 
(Lins 2017; Pereira Filho 2002; Telebrasil 2004; Kubota and Sousa 2012). “The 
creation of a national systems of telecommunication ended activities of foreign 
enterprises, such as Western Cables & Wireless (Telex), Radiobras (RCA), Italcable 
(ITT) (Pereira Filho 2002, 38).” Leonel Brizola is an exemplary case. He was 
the governor of the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul when he nationalized 
the local ITT branch: an action that was completely against the policy that the 
United States had been promoting (Cervo and Bueno 2002).
In 1963, the Brazilian Telecommunications Act was enacted, and in 1965, 
the military regime centralized telecommunications policy and established 
Embratel—a year prior to Brazil joining the international satellite communications 
Intelsat consortium. The Ministry of Communications was created in 1967, and 
in 1976, the Center for Telecommunications Research and Development was 
established in the city of Campinas as a center for the development of national 
ICT technologies. The creation of the holding Telebrás in 1972 established a 
national system that intended to be universal and interconnected. Telebrás and 
the infant technological industry have been backed by government procurement 
in an attempt to emulate the American Camelot experience (Lins 2017; Pereira 
Filho 2002; Telebrasil 2004; Kubota and Sousa 2012).
Along with communications policies, scientific and aerospace R&D institutions 
were established between the 1940s and the 1980s, such as the National Institute 
12 No início da década de 60, 80% das comunicações do País estavam com a canadense Companhia Telefônica 
Brasileira — CTB — (Rio, São Paulo, Espírito Santo e Minas Gerais) e com a norte-americana Cia. Telefônica 
Nacional, da ITT (Paraná e Rio Grande do Sul (Telebrasil 2004, 13).
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for Space Research (INPE), the Instituto da Aeronáutica (ITA), the CAPES-CNPq 
system (for perfecting and coordinating R&D), the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the state-owned Embraer, and so on (Câmara dos Deputados 2010; 
Santos and Neto 2005; Medeiros and Perilo 1990).
This period marked the attempt of Brazilian authorities to structure an 
industrial–military and ICT complex to master foreign technologies. The process 
was characterized by the installation of factories of large US and European 
manufacturers in Brazil. However, these factories were branches responsible for 
the decentralized production of some low and medium technological components. 
There was no big science at work, near the scenario in Silicon Valley (Lins 2017; 
Pereira Filho 2002; Telebrasil 2004; Kubota and Sousa 2012).
US technical cooperation has been quite limited in peripheral countries. As 
noted in studies by Hagedoorn (2002), most R&D cooperation has been among 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations—
although there have been limitations even with regards to these nations. Neither 
the world powers nor the United States simply desire to empower potential foes 
or competitors. It has been a logic of deterrence in terms of technology and 
intellectual property protection.
In this way, the growth of the country’s industrial capacity increased the 
outflow of foreign currencies to pay royalties and inputs. Moreover, technology 
faced challenges in Brazil due to the lack of other necessary production factors 
(Santos and Neto 2005). South Korea overcame similar challenges because of Korean 
educational and institutional measures to develop high-tech industrialization, 
as well as the support given by the United States. In contrast, Brazil has relied 
too much on foreign technology in the ICT and aerospace sectors13, particularly 
the United States’ embedded technology, whereas Brazilians have not received 
such support that South Korea has had (Teixeira 2005; Kubota and Sousa 2012). 
Brazilian reliance on these sectors is critical regarding cyber vulnerabilities 
(Fernandes 2015; Vianna 2019).
According to (Negri 2007), the Brazilian FDI attraction policies had no 
requirements related to domestic technology development by multinationals. 
On the contrary, Brazil adopted the understanding that the mere foreign 
13 Regarding avionics and aerospace sectors, “How much share did the North America aerospace avionics market 
accounted for in 2018? North America with over 30% share dominates the market due to presence of major 
aerospace avionics system providers and major full cost carriers” (Bhutani and Wadhwani 2019, n.p).
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presence would be able to boost the national productive structure and 
contribute to the local production of technology, using an ‘open doors’ 
policy (Chiarini 2016, 294)14.
From this perspective, as presented by Chiarini, Brazil had not managed to 
develop national technology up to the 1970s. There was an astonishing lack of 
R&D in the educational system and private sector, in addition to institutional–
political problems, lack of foreign cooperation, and the debt crisis during the 
1980s. According to Herrera (1995), after World War II, Latin America received 
considerable foreign support for the development of science and industry. Although 
financial and technical support was nothing like what Europe and Japan received, 
it was enough to start a technical basis. However, all efforts failed. Extensive 
poverty, persistent social inequality, low standards of education, institutional, 
bureaucracy, and political conundrum are cited by 15 Herrera (1995).
In this way, Gutierrez and Leal assert that these issues continue to be 
important factors during the 21st century, given the fact that Brazil still has not 
created a high-tech industrial complex, such as those created by developed or 
developing countries, just like South Korea and China.
Brazil is one of the few countries among the largest economies in the world 
that does not have an electronic complex that manufactures integrated 
circuits. In addition, the manufacture of electronic goods in Brazil is 
limited, with exceptions, to pure and simple assembly from a total set of 
imported components (kits), which adds little value to the products. The 
creation of an integrated industry will be a game change in this situation, 
strengthening the electronic chain, as link dependence will be reduced 
(Gutierrez and Leal 2004, 6)16.
14 De acordo com Negri (2007) as políticas brasileiras de atração do IDE não tiveram requisitos relacionados 
ao desenvolvimento doméstico de tecnologia por parte das multinacionais. Ao contrário, o Brasil adotou o 
entendimento que a simples presença estrangeira seria capaz de dinamizar a estrutura produtiva nacional 
e contribuir para a produção local de tecnologia, utilizando-se de uma política do tipo ‘portas abertas’ 
(Chiarini 2016, 294).
15 These arguments remind us of the studies of the economist Albert Hirschman. However, as already mentioned, 
it is not the intention of this article to reproduce all the interpretations and theories of Latin American 
development.
16 O Brasil é um dos poucos países, entre as maiores economias mundiais, a não possuir um complexo eletrônico 
que contemple a manufatura de circuitos integrados. Além disso, a fabricação de bens eletrônicos no país 
restringe-se, com exceções, à montagem pura e simples a partir de um conjunto total de componentes importados 
(kits), o que agrega pouco valor aos produtos. A criação de uma indústria de circuitos integrados propiciará 
uma reversão dessa situação, fortalecendo a cadeia eletrônica na medida em que será reduzida a dependência 
de elos (Gutierrez and Leal 2004, 6) 
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The value added locally by electronic companies has fallen, as corporations 
focus on importing ready-made kits, and the knowledge of integrating technology 
and engineering is getting lost. There are few sectors in which Brazil still has the 
capacity to develop competitive technologies, such as optical communication, 
banking automation, and commercial automation. However, the national software 
industry is obtaining good results (Lima and Moreira 2014).
Some examples of Brazil’s technological dependence are mentioned below 
in terms of how much the US ICT industry has penetrated Brazil’s critical 
infrastructures. The following arguments are illustrations of segments of the 
current infrastructure, given the knowledge gaps mentioned in the introduction. 
As the methodology of this study warned, one did not find any aggregate data 
available.
Brazilian civil, military, and government satellite communications depend 
on satellites built, owned, and managed by foreign companies: For example, the 
Embratel Star One series: Brasilsat A1 and A2: Spar Aerospace (Canada) built 
in partnership with Hughes Aircraft (United States); Brasilsat B1, B2, B3, and 
B4: Hughes Aircraft (United States); Star One C1 and C2: Alcatel Space (current 
Thales Alenia Space) (France); Star One C3: Orbital Sciences (United States); 
and Star One C4, D1, and D2 (in development) Space Systems Loral (United 
States) (Câmara dos Deputados 2010). Annual satellite services for monitoring 
and imaging, data, and telecommunications of Embrapa, INMET, Ibama, Caixa 
Econômica Federal, Casa Civil, the Institutional Security Office, the Ministry of 
Communications, the Ministry of Defense, and Petrobras are mostly provided 
by companies from the American military industrial complex and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Câmara dos Deputados 2010). The 
new Brazilian defense satellite (SGDC-1) was built by the French Thales Alenia 
Space (Fernandes 2015).
In terms of website servers, according to data from Telegeography only 
around 20% of Brazilian websites or websites accessed in Brazil are hosted 
in Brazil. Most data are hosted by US servers. These data are similar to the 
information presented as part of the Brazilian Digital Transformation Strategy. 
“Brazil represents 2.5% of the world’s Internet traffic, 40% of IP traffic in Latin 
America, and is the Latin-American country with the biggest concentration of 
installed submarine cables. However, it is home of only 0.9% of all datacenters 
in the world” (Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation, and Communications 
2018, 67).
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Airspace Control: The CINDACTA system (Integrated Center for Air Defense 
and Air Traffic Control) controls the Brazilian airspace. The system was built in 
the 1970s and developed by the French company Thomson, which is known today 
as Thales (Sousa and Sousa 2016). Meanwhile, the SIVAM system for monitoring 
Amazon was developed by Raytheon, an important American weapon company. 
This foreign technological dependence is well perceived by the Brazilian Air 
Force document Plano Estratégico Militar da Aeronáutia 2010-2031:
The pursuit of national self-sufficiency in aeronautics, space, and military 
applications should be prioritized in order to reverse the current undesirable 
situation of heavy dependence of the Brazilian Air Force on foreign suppliers 
(especially for materials involving crucial technologies and export restrictions, 
according to the political criteria of their governments (Ministério da 
Defesa 2010, 85)17.
According to sectorial research by Gomes and Fonseca (2014), our index 
of nationalization of technology in the aerospace sector is around 15% to 35% 
because most technological and extremely sensitive inputs come from international 
sources (Gomes and Fonseca 2014). For mobile phones and other similar ICT 
technologies, Brazil lacks a national company that has managed to master 
sensitive telecom segments. Companies operating in the domestic market are 
merely service providers and communications operators (Kubota and Sousa 
2012). Furthermore, the domestic industry only assembles components of the 
mobile phone industry, such as Positivo Informatica (Lima and Moreira 2014; 
Fernandes 2015). Approximately 80% of network services in Brazil are private 
and international subsidiaries (Presidência da República 2010), and this situation 
remains unaltered (ANATEL 2019).
According to Jorge Henrique Cabral Fernandes—a professor at the Department 
of Computer Science of the Universidade de Brasilia—as long as the Brazilian 
critical and military infrastructures depend on foreign-made sensitive telecom 
components, Brazil will not have total defense capacity.
Without semiconductors for data processing, telecommunications, consumer 
electronics, automotive production, and industrial automation (Ballhaus et 
al. 2012), Brazil’s sovereignty is severely compromised. Although there are 
17 A busca da auto-suficiência nacional em materiais aeronáuticos, espaciais e nos bélicos de emprego aeronáutico 
deve ser priorizada, de modo a reverter a indesejável situação atual, de forte dependência da Força Aérea Brasileira 
dos fornecedores estrangeiros (especialmente para materiais que envolvem tecnologias sensíveis e sofrem restrições 
para exportação, por critérios políticos dos governos dos seus fabricantes (Ministério da Defesa 2010, 85).
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national computer and hardware industries, such as Positivo Informática, 
which is among the ten largest computer “manufacturers” in the world, 
all the chips used in the production line are produced outside the country. 
The design and technological development of these systems are not in the 
national domain (Fernandes 2015, 594)18.
Through an IPEA’s publication named Amazônia e Atlântico Sul: desafios e 
perspectivas para a defesa no Brasil, Fernandes (2015) asserts that Brazil needs to 
master the following high-tech segments to perfect its cyber defense and achieve 
a level of national cyber sovereignty: autonomous electrical energy systems, 
nanomaterials, high purity silicon wafers, semiconductors, microprocessor chips, 
controllers and data entry and exit devices, firmware and device drivers, operational 
systems and their utilities, programming language platforms, libraries of reusable 
software components, computational applications of all types and for all purposes, 
human-machine interfaces suitable for Brazilian culture and language, means of 
wired transmission in optical fiber and coaxial cables, means of wireless terrestrial 
transmission, means of satellite transmission of geostationary communication and 
low orbit; modems, gateways, switches and routers technologies, autonomous 
name service integrated to Iana, national symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic 
ciphers19, semi-autonomous and decentralized public key infrastructures, and 
doctrines and exercises of joint action (Fernandes 2015, 623).
From the above, one cannot deny that Brazil has not mastered the high-tech 
layers of ICT chains. Thus, it has to import sensitive inputs for its critical 
infrastructure. As the Plano Estratégico Militar da Aeronáutia shows, such a 
dependence20 on foreign high-tech sector has worried officials of the armed forces 
(Ministério da Defesa 2010, 85). The relations between the military–industrial 
18 Sem semicondutores, seja para fins de processamento de dados, telecomunicações, eletrônica de consumo, 
produção automotiva e automação industrial (Ballhaus et al., 2012), o Brasil continua a ter sua liberdade de 
ação severamente comprometida, inclusive militar. Embora se tenha no país indústrias intituladas de informática 
e hardware, como a montadora Positivo Informática, que se encontra entre as dez maiores “fabricantes” de 
computadores do mundo,19 todos os chips empregados na linha de produção são produzidos fora do país. 
O projeto e avanço tecnológico desses sistemas também não são de domínio nacional (Fernandes 2015, 594).
19 To master cryptography, technics are important if one points out the fact an important Swiss cryptography 
company (Crypto AG), which has sold cryptography software to more than 120 governments worldwide, was 
in the middle of an international scandal, in which Crypto AG was actually controlled by the American Central 
Intelligence Agency. This way, US intelligence would have the source codes to break through the cryptography 
that was sold.
20 It is not by chance that Russia and China have been managing to structure their own ICT and informational 
complex. International powers usually avoid being dependent on other nations when it comes to strategic 
sectors, even though nowadays it is not always viable due to the so-called complex interdependence and 
outsourcing economy.
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complex and telecoms were clearly observed in the episode where Edward Snowden 
leaked Anglo-Saxon secret files in 2013. Snowden’s (2013, 2014) materials suggest 
that digital surveillance, backdoors, and supply chain attacks have hit Brazil’s 
federal government, although the details of these attacks are not completely clear. 
Some parts of the NSA slides were censured, which means that these materials 
were only available for a few groups in the NSA.
Should this episode confirm the concerns of the Brazilian military? According 
to Fernandes (2015), Brazil should avoid foreign ICT dependence due to cyber 
vulnerabilities. However, one cannot be completely sure that such a correlation 
exists. A significant amount of the available software and hardware segments, 
devices, and telecom infrastructure of the country should be checked to verify 
the quantitative data.
Conclusion
In short, by gathering theoretical concepts of international relations and cyber 
warfare, in addition to concrete evidence revealed by Snowden, it is possible 
to provide a general understanding of such an intricate hybrid war scenario. 
Although this study may help academics fill gaps in knowledge, it admits that 
such a qualitative approach is not sufficient to give an ultimate outcome.
Bearing in mind such methodological concerns, one claims that the United 
States has managed to foster its key companies, which had the state of the art 
of technology. They penetrate other nations’ development projects and markets. 
This strategy has not only brought great economic benefits to the United States, 
but also astonishing international influence and cyber advantages in terms of 
cyber war apparatuses.
On the contrary, the integrity and sovereignty of Brazilian telecommunications 
have been attacked by US cyber war structures. Considering that Brazil is deeply 
dependent on the foreign ICT industry, particularly that of the United States, 
there might be a chance that such high-tech dependence is linked to cyber 
threats, such as those that Snowden has brought to light. This scenario implies 
that Brazilian authorities should invest in ICT and cyber defense strategies to 
strengthen cyber security. Further multidimensional studies are required from 
fields such as IT, cyber security, national defense, telecommunication engineering, 
and econometric studies to clarify quantitative data.
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